inquiry. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case. Duke's petition to the Supreme Court seeking review of the Federal Circuit's decision was denied 11 .
The Federal Circuit held that the experimental-use exemption for patent infringement does not apply to research that furthers universities' "business objectives," including research and educating and enlightening students and faculty. The court held that "so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental-use defense" 9 . Moreover, the profit or nonprofit status of the user is not relevant. Thus, the court found that the experimental-use exception should not insulate commercial research from claims of patent infringement. This applied to Duke University, which, as Judge Gajarsa noted, was "not shy in pursuing an aggressive patent licensing program from which it derives a not insubstantial revenue stream" 9 .
The FTC and NRC reports question whether the absence of an observed anticommons is associated with researchers' lack of knowledge about the Madey decision [6] [7] [8] . As more researchers and their institutions become more knowledgeable about the potential for patent violations following Madey, they, as well as private industry, may become more litigious in protecting their intellectual property rights, allowing an anticommons to emerge.
We studied stem cell patents to determine the rate of litigation of such patents, to describe that litigation and to determine if it has, in fact, been increasing since Madey. We chose to study stem cell patent litigation industry is unable to innovate and successfully commercialize new products. Moreover, the risk of being sued for patent violation has now become a major concern to universities since Madey v. Duke University 9 . John Madey was a laboratory director at Duke University who received two patents related to free electron laser technology. After internal disagreements, Duke removed him as a director but continued to use his patents. Madey sued, claiming patent infringement. The district court dismissed his claim based on the common law experimental-use doctrine 10 or the idea that infringement is acceptable when done to satisfy "philosophical" or scientific inquiry. The experimental-use exemption was articulated in 1813 by Judge Story 10 , who used the term "philosophical" instead of "scientific" to describe the experimentaluse exemption from patent infringement. The essential component of the court's reasoning was that those skilled in such "useful arts" are free to use the knowledge imparted by a patent disclosure for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical I t has been theorized 1,2 that litigation is an important contributor to the concept of the anti-commons, which occurs when multiple owners hold the right to exclude each other from a scarce resource, so that no one holds an effective right of entry and underuse of the resource results 3 . This may occur with royalty stacking, where an inventor must obtain multiple licenses to commercialize a product. If this activity is leading to an anti-commons, then, is the multitude of patents that has been granted actually inhibiting, rather than facilitating, the transfer of technology 3 ?
Patent litigation and the strategies firms follow to protect themselves from the risk of litigation (e.g., defensive patenting by enlarging a firm's portfolio of patents to influence settlement terms or foregoing otherwise valuable research because of the risk of litigation) 4 generate costs that may divert resources away from innovative activities, or make subsequent commercialization no longer feasible or more costly. Thus, litigation and strategies to avoid litigation can be seen as contributing to an anti-commons.
The perception that a large amount of litigation is occurring is one point advocates use to justify patent reform. p at e n t s concerning genetic engineering vectors, their isolation, preparation or purification" (C12 15/) compared to stem cell patents for "undifferentiated human, animal or plant cells, e.g., cell lines; tissues; cultivation or maintenance thereof; culture media" (C12N 5/). However, when you compare the rate of litigation by patent, taking into account that some patents were litigated multiple times, there is no significant difference between these two categories ( Table 1) .
In phase 2 of our study, there were three lawsuits in the category encompassing peptides having more than 20 amino acids (C07K 14/) and one lawsuit in each of the other categories. There were no significant differences in litigation between the categories studied ( Table 2) .
We identified the plaintiffs in each lawsuit. Some lawsuits involved more than one plaintiff. We included all plaintiffs we were able to identify. In phase 1, 7 out of 67 (10%) cases involved university plaintiffs. Of the 28 plaintiffs we were able to identify, 5 (18%) were university plaintiffs (Supplementary Table  1) . In phase 2, we did not identify any university plaintiffs (Supplementary Table 2) .
Similarly, a case can involve more than one defendant. In phase 1, we identified 89 defendants, most of whom were involved in only one case. Five of the defendants were involved in two cases. Only one defendant was a university plaintiff (Supplementary Table 3 ). In phase 2, we identified three defendants. One of the defendants, a representative of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), was involved in three cases (Supplementary Table 4) .
In phase 1, we calculated the difference in months between the time a patent issues and a suit is filed. The difference in months between the time a patent issues and a suit is filed is shown in Supplementary Table 5 . The average time difference by category for 64 cases is shown in Supplementary Table 6 . (We eliminated three cases for this calculation because the filing dates given by LitAlert (the patent and trademark litigation alert database published by Westlaw) are the same as issue dates. This is highly improbable and can probably be attributed to input error. One case in category C12N 5/ was eliminated and two cases in category C12 15/ were eliminated.) Because Monsanto seems to be following a deliberate policy of suing over older patents 14, 15 Table 6 ).
who identified three dominant areas where most stem cell patenting has occurred. They are within three IPC codes: C07K 14/ (peptides having more than 20 amino acids), C12N 5/ (undifferentiated human, animal or plant cells, e.g., cell lines; tissues; cultivation or maintenance thereof; culture media) and C12 15/ (mutation or genetic engineering; DNA or RNA concerning genetic engineering vectors, their isolation, preparation or purification) (See Box 1).
In phase 1 of our study, we identified 67 cases involving 23 different patents, meaning many patents were litigated multiple times. Of note is one patent 14 , owned by Monsanto, a multinational agricultural biotech company, which was litigated 32 times. In phase 2, we identified five cases involving five patents.
In phase 1, there were no lawsuits in the category encompassing "peptides having more than 20 amino acids" (C07K 14/). There were significantly (P<0.001) more law suits for stem cell patents involving "mutation or genetic engineering; DNA or RNA for two reasons. First, the area of stem cell research and technology is now once again at the forefront of the nation's research agenda, since President Barack Obama's executive order removed some limitations from stem cell research 12 . The research has potential to yield new treatments and cures for debilitating and fatal diseases so it is vital that the US patent system encourage innovation in this area to maintain global competitiveness.
Second, concerns about an emerging anticommons are particularly acute in stem cell research, where there are few or no alternatives to patented technologies that enable embryonic or adult stem cells to be directed into specific cell lineages. The interdependence of the technologies involved with these stem cell patents and the fragmentation of their ownership across many organizations could make the task of coordinating access to key technologies an intensive as well as costly process, and so create an anti-commons in the field 13 .
Results
We built on the work of Bergman and Graff 13
Box 1 Study description
Bergman and Graff identified stem cell patents by using the IPC code in which the technical fields of a patent's primary "inventive steps" are reported 13 . This allowed them to identify the areas where most stem cell patenting has occurred. According to these investigators, the three dominant areas in which stem cell patenting occur are within the IPC codes C07K 14/ (peptides having more than 20 amino acids), C12N 5/ (undifferentiated human, animal or plant cells, e.g., cell lines; tissues; cultivation or maintenance thereof; culture media) and C12 15/ (mutation or genetic engineering; DNA or RNA concerning genetic engineering vectors, their isolation, preparation or purification) (http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/ipc8/?lang=en).
We completed this study in two phases. During the week of June 30 to July 4, 2008, we accessed the USPTO database (http://patft.uspto.gov/) using these codes for phase 1. In phase 2, using these codes, the USPTO supplied us with a list of patents issued between January 1, 2006 and February 9, 2010 (this list is available on request). The reasons for completing the study in two phases include updating this study at the editor's request and the fact that an error on the full-text USPTO database prevents us from searching on these codes after January 1, 2006. This error has been reported to and acknowledged by the USPTO. In both phases, we took a 30% random sample of patents in each area identified by Bergman and Graff to be included in our study.
For the first phase, we cross-referenced the patents we identified with the LitAlert database, which contains records for patent lawsuits filed in the 94 US District Courts and reported to the commissioner of the USPTO. In addition, records for thousands of lawsuits filed since the early 1970s that have not been reported in the USPTO Official Gazette for Patents 18 are included. We searched the LitAlert database for the patent numbers contained in each of our three data sets. During the second phase of the study, we followed the same method beginning and ending our cross-reference to LitAlert on February 15, 2010.
Many cases involve more than one patent. LitAlert identifies a primary patent and lists any other patent that might be part of the litigated case. To avoid multiple counting of lawsuits, in both phases, we selected only those cases where the primary patent number was listed in our data sets. Once we identified the appropriate cases, we cross-referenced the patent numbers involved in the cases with the USPTO database to obtain the issue dates of the patents.
PAT e N T S business managers and scientists from ten pharmaceutical and biotech companies, as well as others, including university researchers and technology transfer officers, patent lawyers and trade association personnel 14 . They found that university researchers, to the extent that they are doing noncommercial work, are left alone. In fact, Walsh and colleagues found that industry welcomes research like this because it helps develop more knowledge about the patented technology. Moreover, industry respondents suggested that companies, because of the negative publicity that usually attends assertive action against a university, believe it is not worth bringing such suits.
The National Research Council arranged with Walsh and colleagues to undertake a second, more extensive survey 8 than the first. A sample of 1,124 persons included, among others, investigators in universities, government laboratories and other nonprofit institutions, 563 industry scientists, and 299 researchers working on a signaling protein.
The findings of the second study are similar to those of the first in terms of technology access issues. For example, in the sample above, "unreasonable terms for obtaining research inputs" was cited by 10% of survey respondents and "too many patents covering needed research inputs" was cited by only 3% of survey respondents as a reason for project abandonment 8 .
Limitations and conclusion
There are limitations to this study. First, we studied only one type of patent-stem cell patents-in three categories. Therefore, the results of this small study cannot be extrapolated to other industries or areas. Secondly, we only studied litigation, which is theorized to be but one contributor to the anticommons, albeit thought to be an important one.
There are also the study's technical limitations. Federal law requires clerks of the courts of the United States to notify the USPTO not be a protected class that benefits from a research exemption when the research furthers their business interests. Further evidence that universities seek to protect their intellectual property interests is that in phase 1, excluding the Monsanto patents, of the seven patents that were litigated more than once, three of these patents were associated with universities. Of these 12 cases, 7 cases involved universities (Supplementary Table 1 ).
Only one of the defendants we identified was a university. Madey was decided in October 2002. Because 46% of the litigation we studied in phase 1 was after Madey, and the average time between patent issue and institution of a lawsuit is 62.52 months (using the average time, excluding Monsanto), it appears that the post-Madey fears of opening a floodgate of litigation against universities is not being realized at the moment, at least for these stem cell patent categories. The one case we found with a university being a defendant was filed in 1999, which predates Madey by several years. These results are supported by phase 2 of the study in which we did not find a university named as defendant.
These findings are consistent with two surveys Walsh and colleagues undertook 8, 16 . In the first survey, they conducted 70 interviews with intellectual property attorneys, Similarly, in phase 2, we calculated the difference in months between the time a patent issues and litigation. However, we are doubtful that these data are meaningful as we identified so few cases associated with these later-issuing patents. However, the fact that we identified so few cases could validate phase 1's results that, on average, it takes over 62 months (excluding lawsuits involving Monsanto as plaintiff) for a suit to be filed after a patent issues (Supplementary Table 7) .
In phase 1, we calculated the number of cases litigated per year including and excluding Monsanto. Again, we eliminated the three cases which seemed to have incorrect filing dates. (We cannot obtain a rate of litigation for the total number of patents for all IPC codes studied, nor can we get a rate of litigation per patent because the total number of patents identified is inflated. For example, a patent might have the code C07K 14/ and the C12 15/ code and so the total would contain duplicate patents.) The results are shown in Figure 1 . In phase 2, because there were so few cases, we did not calculate number of cases litigated per year.
Discussion
For the stem cell patents in both phase 1 and 2, the rate of litigation to issued patents in the categories studied is extremely small, which calls into question the claim that a large amount of litigation is causing an anti-commons. However, when a patent is litigated, often it is litigated more than once, meaning that relatively few stem cell patents account for a large portion of litigation for the categories of patents we studied.
Contrary to the idea that industry is responsible for almost all patent litigation, it appears that for stem cell patent litigation, universities have already assumed the role of plaintiff. This supports the Federal Circuit's finding in Madey that universities have their own business objectives and therefore should PAT e N T S
